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 I. Introduction. 
 
The last decade of research has witnessed an explosion of both theoretical and 
empirical work on the nature of the monetary transmission mechanism and the 
corresponding normative implications for monetary policy.  The books by Walsh and 
Woodford provide an outstanding exposition and survey of the work in this field.  These 
books focus on the development of monetary theory, but both books also contain some 
complementary discussion on empirical evidence.  In contrast, the collection of papers in 
the Inflation Targeting NBER volume outlines some of the issues that arise when 
applying the tools described by Walsh and Woodford to the policy goal of targeting 
inflation rates.  In this review we will first focus on the books by Walsh and Woodford, 
and then turn to the forthcoming NBER volume.  A central theme of all three works is the 
desirability of abstracting from money demand in the analysis of monetary policy.  After 
a few preliminary remarks on the Walsh and Woodford texts, we will focus the bulk of 
our discussion on the absence of money from these models. 
II.  Two monetary texts. 
 
Taken together, the books by Walsh and Woodford provide an excellent 
exposition of recent work in monetary theory and are thus suitable for second year 
graduate courses or reference texts for practitioners.  The books are not substitutes for 
one another, however, but are quite distinct. 
Walsh’s book is more suitable for use as a textbook.  The book provides a fairly 
comprehensive survey of work in monetary theory and policy over the last 15-20 years.  
The diverse list of topics include: the credit channel of monetary policy, the game-
theoretic approach to modeling policy choices, the search-theoretic micro models of fiat money, and monetary policy operating procedures.  The book is not meant to break new 
ground, but to bring together a large literature into one manageable volume.  There are 
several helpful features of the Walsh text that are linked to the fact that it is a textbook.  
First, there are lengthy appendices that carefully walk through standard linear 
approximation methods and ways in which models can be calibrated to the data.  These 
appendices will be particularly useful for graduate students who are acquiring these tools.  
Second, there are problems at the end of the chapters that provide a nice review of the 
concepts developed in the chapter.  Finally, the reference list for the text is incredibly 
exhaustive and helpful—it has already become the first place we look for a relevant 
citation. 
Compared to the first edition of the book, Walsh has made two important changes 
in this second edition.  First he has included a significant discussion of equilibrium 
indeterminacy. Indeterminacy arises when a theoretical model has more than one 
equilibrium. In the models in Walsh’s text, this typically implies that there are an infinite 
number of equilibria.  This situation is called “indeterminate” because the economy could 
potentially settle on any of these equilibria, or jump randomly between equilibria in 
response to shocks. These shocks could be movements in economic fundamentals, eg., 
total factor productivity movements, or be entirely unrelated to the economy.  In the latter 
case, the resulting equilibria are called “sunspot equilibria” as the economy is responding 
to purely extraneous noise.  These fluctuations reduce welfare and thus should be 
avoided.  Walsh discusses the recent work on monetary policy rules that ensure that these 
type of equilibria do not arise.  A second significant addition to the Walsh text is an 
  1entirely new Chapter 11 that describes the recent policy work on what has come to be 
called the standard “New Keynesian model.”   
The Woodford book picks up from Chapter 11 of Walsh as Woodford’s primary 
focus is the New Keynesian model.  In contrast to Walsh, Woodford does not intend to 
survey a large literature but is instead an exposition on his and his co-authors’ research 
on monetary theory and policy. Woodford is clear about this on the very first page of the 
Preface:   
This book is a progress report on my struggles with two problems that have engaged me 
since graduate school.  The first is the problem of reconciling macroeconomics with 
microeconomic theory without simply ignoring the main concerns…of how to understand 
and mitigate the temporary departures from an efficient utilization of existing productive 
capacity that result from slow adjustment of [nominal] wages or prices….The second is 
the problem of reconciling…the understanding of [central] bankers that the crucial 
monetary policy question is that of the appropriate level for short-term nominal interest 
rates…and the theoretical literature [that] has, until recently, always modeled monetary 
policy in terms of a central bank’s control of the supply of base money…or some broader 
monetary aggregate.  (page xiii). 
The book is thus a personal treatise on Woodford’s work on interest rate 
operating procedures in variants of what Walsh calls the standard New Keynesian model.  
Although many of the chapters in Woodford’s book have previously circulated in 
working paper version, the book is meant to break new ground, culminating in the final 
chapters on Woodford’s current work on optimal interest-rate rules.  Woodford’s book 
  2includes extensive appendices that sketch the log-linearizations used throughout the text 
along with proofs of the major propositions.   
There are many drawbacks to a personal treatise including the natural narrowing 
of coverage.  In this sense, Walsh is the better choice for a textbook.  But a personal 
treatise does provide free rein to an author, and Woodford has masterfully exploited this 
opportunity to use a relatively simple micro-based general equilibrium model to address 
many, if not all, of the major issues in monetary policy today.  There are several recurring 
normative themes throughout Woodford’s treatise including: (i) the efficacy of rule-based 
policy-making, (ii) the need for greater transparency in the articulation of monetary 
policy, and (iii) the importance of history-dependence in any description of optimal 
policy.  These three themes are all related to private sector expectations.  The first two 
ease the difficulty of the private sector forecasting future monetary policy actions, while 
the third is an implication of private sector forward-looking behavior.  This is a 
remarkable implication of Woodford’s work: if the private sector is forward-looking in 
its behavior, then the benevolent central bank will conduct policy by including backward 
elements in its policy.  We will return to this implication below. 
III.  Where has all the money gone? 
 
  A common theme in both Walsh and Woodford is the dismissal of monetary 
aggregates and money demand relations as objects useful for attention.   For example, 
Walsh notes:   
 
While attention will be paid to the demand for money at a theoretical level, the analysis 
of money demand is of less relevance now that it has been in the past.  This change has 
  3occurred because, to a large extent, central banks operate today by employing a short-
term interest [rate] as their policy operating target, with a de-emphasis on the quantity 
of money. [Page 4.] 
Woodford’s approach is the same: 
Once one knows the equilibrium paths of interest and prices, the money-demand relation 
can then be used to determine the implied evolution of the money supply as well.  But this 
last relation does not play an important role in determining equilibrium inflation under 
such an analysis.  [Page 53.]    
The absence of monetary aggregates from the analysis is ultimately a theoretical 
argument, so we now turn to modeling issues.  The workhorse of modern 
macroeconomics as developed by Woodford and reviewed by Walsh is the New 
Keynesian model.  The theoretical model consists of households and firms.  We will 
discuss each in turn. 
We first develop the general model with money. We will then consider special 
cases of this model: the cashless-limit model, the case where utility is separable between 
real money balances and consumption, and finally the general case where real balances 
impact the marginal utility of consumption.  
Households are the sole users of money.  Following a long tradition in monetary 
economics, the usefulness of money in carrying out exchange is proxied by assuming that 
money generates utility to the households that hold it.  Hence, the typical household’s 
utility function (denoted by the function U) includes preferences for consumption, 
leisure, and real money balances.  The household is part of a family dynasty and thus has 
an infinite planning horizon.  The basic preference specification is given by 
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where ct, Lt, and mt+1=Mt+1/Pt denote consumption, work effort and real money 
balances, respectively. Real money balances are defined to be the balances held by the 
household at the end of period t. U denotes the per-period utility function. The notation 
 denotes the household’s expectation of future variables given the information it has at 
the current time, denoted time 0.  The parameter β is between zero and one and denotes 
the household’s time preference rate.  A larger (smaller) β means a more (less) patient 
household.  The variable c
0 E
t actually denotes a combination of the large number of 
individual consumption goods the household can buy.  These consumption goods are 
distinct but there is some degree of substitutability across these goods.  This preference 
for substitution is important below in the description of firm behavior.  For simplicity the 
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where ω is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. Holding the household’s level 
of consumption constant, a 1% change in the real wage will increase labor supply by 
(1/ω)% (see, eg., Woodford, page 188).  
  The household begins the period with Mt cash balances and Bt-1 holdings of 
nominal bonds that pay a nominal rate of it-1 (between t-1 and t).  After engaging in goods 
trading, the household ends the period with cash balances given by the budget constraint: 
  ,   t t t t t t t t
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t are the bonds held at the end of period t and carried into t+1, and wt is the real 
wage . Note that   is the cash available to the household after leaving the goods 
market.  By placing  in the time-t utility function, the model is assuming that cash at 
the end of trading facilitates trading.  That is, the cash you have in your pocket after 
leaving the store (not when entering the store) facilitates trading. Carlstrom and Fuerst 
(2001) call this cash-when-I’m-done (CWID) timing.  The first order conditions to the 
household’s problem include the following:  
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) (  denotes the partial derivative at time-t.   
  Equation (1) represents Fisherian interest rate determination.  A dollar invested in 
a bond today results in the loss of  
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 units of pleasure. This is the 
marginal cost of the investment.  The marginal benefit of this investment is    
dollars next period that provide on average 
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tomorrow.  Given that households discount future utility at a constant rate β, the rational 
household purchases bonds until equation (1) holds. Without uncertainty this looks like 
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increase in current consumption decreases the marginal utility of consumption today and 
thus decreases real interest rates. 
  Equation 2 is the money demand for households. Real money balances depend 
negatively on the opportunity cost of holding money, i, and positively on planned 
consumption  The benefit of holding cash is given by the left-hand-side, while the cost is 
the foregone interest, the right-hand-side of equation (2).  Finally, equation (3) will give 
the labor supply decision for households. The cost of working today is the lost enjoyment 
of leisure, while the benefit is the real wage that can be used to purchase consumption.    
  Next we need to specify the production technology and the behavior of firms.  
There are a large number of imperfectly competitive firms each using a labor-only 




t L A Y = t is the exogenous level of total factor 
productivity, and the superscript j denotes firm j.  Each firm’s real marginal cost is thus 
given by  .  The profit-maximizing firm expands employment until the real 
wage, w
t t t A w s / =
t, is equal to the product of marginal productivity, At, and real marginal cost, st.
  If firms were perfectly competitive, wages would be equal to marginal (in this 
case average) productivity so that real marginal cost would be always equal to one. 
Instead each firm is assumed to have some monopoly power in that it is the sole producer 
of a particular consumer good. This monopoly power is limited, however, as there are a 
large number of firms and the consumers have some substitutability across goods. This 
  7degree of substitution is given by θ, where a large θ denotes less monopoly power. Since 
all firms are symmetric, the analysis is typically confined to symmetric equlibria in which 
all firms set the same nominal price so that all relative prices are equal to unity.   
(Relative prices will fluctuate outside of the steady-state in the case of sticky prices.  We 
will consider sticky price adjustment below).  The monopoly power implies that this real 
price of unity is above marginal cost.  A decrease in marginal cost, st, corresponds to an 
increase in monopoly power and a resulting decline in labor demand as firms have a 
stronger incentive to supply less output and keep prices higher. 
  Another way of thinking about real marginal cost is noting that, in equilibrium, 
the inverse of marginal cost is the “mark-up,” the mark-up of price over marginal cost. In 
the steady-state or with perfectly flexible prices this mark-up is given by  ) 1 /( − θ θ .  As θ 
increases this mark-up falls so that in the limit of θ going to infinity, the goods price is 
set equal to marginal cost and the mark-up is one.    
  The standard assumption, however, is that prices are not flexible. Following 
Calvo (1983), the standard model assumes that firms must set prices in advance and 
cannot change them readily. In particular, each period a fraction (1-α) of firms get to set 
a new price, while the remaining firms must use their old price. As α gets smaller the 
model comes closer to perfect price flexibility. The (1-α) of firms that do adjust their 
prices this period do so by factoring in the current level of marginal cost, and their 
forecast of future price movements. 
  Because of these “sticky prices” the mark-up or real marginal cost is not constant. 
It is impacted by inflation and future inflation. Woodford demonstrates that the 
  8assumption of Calvo pricing yields the following New-Keynsian Phillip’s curve (or 
Calvo pricing equation):  
  t t t t t u E s + + = +1 ˆ ˆ ~ ˆ π β κ π       ( 4 )  
where  
  ) 1 (
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Hats over variables indicate log deviations from trend or steady state (eg., 
), except variables already in percent terms are simple deviations from 
steady state (eg., 
() ) ln( ln ˆ ss t t s s s − =
ss t t π π π − = ˆ ).  Recall that the variable α denotes the fraction of firms 
that do not get to adjust prices in the current period, and ω is the inverse of the Frisch 
labor supply elasticity. The fraction (1-α) of firms that do adjust prices today (and thus 
determine πt) base their choice on the current level of marginal cost and their forecast of 
future price movements. An increase in inflation will decrease the mark-up (increase st) 
leading to an increase in firms’ labor demand. The exogenous variable ut is a shock to 
this pricing equation. It can be interpreted as any exogenous shock that alters the 
relationship between prices and marginal cost, eg., a shock to the degree of monopoly 
power. 
  This completes the basic description of the model.  Our initial interest is in the 
presence or absence of money balances from the model.  Money balances enter this 








Ucm , real balances affect the marginal 
utility of consumption and thus bond pricing directly through (1) and marginal cost 
  9through its effect on the real wage in (3).  For example, if  , an increase in the 
nominal interest rate will lower real money demand (m), thus decreasing the marginal 
utility of consumption ( ), and decreasing labor supply.  Second, even if we ignore 
these effects and assume  , there are normative implications as real balances still 
affect welfare through their presence in the utility function. Initially, Woodford sidesteps 
both of these issues by focusing on a model at the “cashless limit”, i.e., a world in which 
money provides no transactions role so that 
0 > cm U
c U
0 = cm U
0 = m U for all m.  Money is willingly held in 
this model because it is paid a nominal rate of return equal to the bond rate. 
  In the case of the cashless limit, the Fisher equation (1) can be written in log 
deviations as 
         ( 6 )   ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ 1 1 + + − − = t t t t t t E i c E c π σ
where σ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Real interest rates are positively 
related to consumption growth, since higher consumption tomorrow decreases the 
incentive to save thus increasing interest rates. This elasticity is denoted by σ.  Since 
output is equal to consumption, we can alternatively write this as 
) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ 1 1
n
t t t t t t t r E i x E x − − − = + + π σ        ( 7 )  
where  and  .  The term  is the log 
level of output that would arise in an economy with perfectly flexible prices so that  is 
the (logged) output gap.  The variable   is the “natural” real rate of interest, the real 
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  10rate of interest that would arise in an economy with perfectly flexible prices.  In honor of 
Knut Wicksell, Woodford refers to this rate as the “Wicksellian” interest rate.   
  Because policymakers frequently use a measure of the output gap to base policy 
decisions, it is convenient to use the labor supply decision (3) to transform (6) into an 
expression in the output gap. The transformation between the output gap and real 
marginal cost is given by   







x .            ( 8 )  
Marginal cost and the output gap are positively related because increases in the output 
gap imply increases in labor demand and thus movements along the labor supply curve.  
These movements imply higher real wages and thus higher marginal cost.  Using (8), the 
pricing equation can be expressed as  
  t t t t t u E x + + = +1 ˆ ˆ ˆ π β κ π       ( 9 )  
with  ) 1 (
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  To summarize, in the case of the cashless limit economy, real behavior is 
described by (5) and (9).
1  It is important to emphasize that these relationships are 
derived from optimizing, microeconomic-based models of household and firm behavior.  
This is the “new” part of the term “New Keynesian.”  The Keynesian modifier comes 
from the static counterpart to (5) and (9).  If we eliminated all future variables, then 
equation (5) would look like a standard downward sloped IS curve, while equation (9) 
would look like an upward sloped Phillips curve.   
  11  Optimal policy consists of choosing policy instruments to achieve some objective.  
In the present context the most natural objective is the well-being of the typical 
household.  Woodford demonstrates that the household’s utility function implies a central 
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where   




λ ≡ x .  The two terms in the loss function result from a quadratic approximation to 
the representative agent’s utility function. (Recall that in the cashless limit, household 
utility is a function of just two variables: consumption and work effort.) Why does the 
household dislike inflation and output gap variability? Since only a fraction of firms 
move their prices in any period, movements in the inflation rate necessarily imply 
movements in relative prices.  These relative price fluctuations lead to a sub-optimal 
distribution of production across the variety of goods.  Hence, the household dislikes 
fluctuations in inflation (πt).  As for output, the optimal level of output is the level that 
would arise with perfectly flexible prices.
2 Hence, the household dislikes fluctuations in 
the output gap (xt). Note that since θ > 1 and κ is typically calibrated to be quite small, 
the weight on the output gap, 
θ
κ
λ ≡ x , is significantly smaller than the weight on 
inflation. 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 These would also describe the model for the case of Ucm = 0. 
2 Note that the flexible price economy is only optimal because the distortion due to monopoly power is 
  12  Optimal policy consists of optimizing the loss function subject to the two 
constraints (5) and (9).  Notice that money balances are not part of this problem as we are 
at the cashless limit, and that the nominal interest rate is a free variable as it only enters 
into the Fisher equation (5).  Hence, optimal policy can be found by considering only the 
constraint (9), and then using (5) to back out the implied path for the interest rate.  The  
condition characterizing optimal policy is given by 
0 ˆ ˆ = ∆ + t x t x λ π κ .
3         ( 1 0 )  
 
where  .    1 ˆ ˆ ˆ − − ≡ ∆ t t t x x x
 
A few comments are in order.   
  First, optimal policy is not described by a Taylor-type interest rate operating 
procedure. In fact, the level as well as the variability of the nominal interest rate is 
entirely irrelevant!  This raises the issue of how to implement the policy implied by (10).  
We will return to this below. 
  Second, if there are no shocks to the Phillips curve, ut = 0 for all t, then optimal 
policy is trivial: set  0 ˆ ˆ = = t t x π , i.e., if you stabilize inflation the output gap will also be 
stabilized. Basically, if inflation is constant, the sticky price distortion is eliminated and 
the economy’s real behavior mimics the flexible price economy. The implied interest rate 
to support this policy implies moving the real funds rate to keep it at the level associated 
with the real rate of interest that would arise in a world with perfectly flexible prices, i.e., 
, the “natural” or “Wicksellian” real rate of interest. 
n
t r
                                                                                                                                                 
assumed to be offset through a fiscal subsidy to employment.  
3 This is the optimality condition under the assumption that the central bank can commit to future policy 
actions.  The outcome without commitment, the discretionary outcome, will be discussed later. 
  13  Third, even with Phillips curve shocks, the fact that λx is relatively small (much 
less than one) leads to a policy that sharply penalizes movements in inflation but is more 
accommodating of movements in the output gap.   
  Finally, optimal policy is history-dependent.  That is, the optimal choice of 
current inflation (πt) and the output gap (xt) depends upon the lagged value of the output 
gap (xt-1).  This immediately raises implementation problems.  How can we commit the 
current central bank to consider lagged values of the output gap even though these lagged 
values are no longer part of the objective function?  This is the classic time inconsistency 
problem, a topic that we will turn to below.  
  This cashless approach to policy analysis does avoid the modeling of money, but 
it seems quite unlike the world in which we currently live. Since large quantities of zero-
interest cash balances are held by private agents, it seems reasonable to assume that these 
balances somehow aid in transactions facilitation.  Woodford answers this criticism by 
also considering models with transactions frictions in which real money balances do 
affect utility ( ).  Let us begin with the case of  0 > m U 0 = cm U . This is also the case 
emphasized in Walsh. 
  Because real money balances enter utility (and therefore interest rates are in the 
indirect utility function), Woodford shows that the loss function now includes interest 
rate variability as well and is given by 
   
2 2 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ t i t x t t i x L λ λ π + + =
















≡ η  is the semi-elasticity of money demand, and 
m
c
≡ ν   is the steady-state velocity of money.  The symbol χ is given by  c cm U mU / ≡ χ . 
With separable utility between money and consumption this value is zero. It is important 
to note that the value of λi depends entirely on two factors: (i) money demand parameters 
such as the semi-elasticity of money demand  ) ( i η and the steady-state level of velocity 
) (ν ; and (ii) the relationship between marginal cost and the output gap, 
) (
1
1 − +σ ω
. The 
cashless limit economy studied earlier occurs when real money balances become 
unimportant or  ∞ → ν .  
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2 ≡ . This condition is a Taylor-type rule with lagged 
interest rates, current inflation, and current output growth.  Two key results are evident.  
First, as before, optimal policy is history-dependent. Optimal policy depends on both 
lagged interest rates and the lagged output gap. In fact, the two ρ’s each exceed unity so 
that policy is super-inertial with a coefficient greater than unity on the lagged interest 
rate. Second, condition (11) contains no explicit forecasts so that policy need not be 
forward-looking.  But note the importance of λi: the coefficients on inflation and the 
output gap are inversely proportional to it.  As noted above, the size of λi comes directly 
from the utility functional, so it appears that money demand does matter for optimal 
  15monetary policy.  Whenever the interest rate elasticity of money demand is positive, λi > 
0. That is, the public dislikes interest rate variability. Because of that, optimal monetary 
policy entails responding less to inflation and output gap growth deviations.  
How large are these real balance effects?  This is a question of parameter 
calibration. A non-separable utility functional is necessary to plausibly calibrate the 
money demand function.  In this case, expressions (5) and (9) are altered to reflect this 
change.  For example, (5) is now given by  
) ˆ ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ 1 1 1 t t
n
t t t t t t t m m r E i x E x − − − − − = + + + σχ π σ . 
The last term arises because, with non-separable utility, real money balances impact the 
marginal utility of consumption. If  an increase in real money balances today 
increases the marginal utility of current consumption and increases real interest rates. To 
get a sense of the size of χ, suppose that the utility function between consumption and 
real balances is given by 
0 > cm U

















where D is a constant necessary to calibrate velocity and 1/b =  i iη is the interest elasticity 









Since the average quarterly nominal interest rate in the US is very small (0.01),χ will 
necessarily be small. Assuming the interest rate elasticity of money is .1 (b =10), an 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ of 1/2, and quarterly base velocity of 4, we 
  16calibrate  . 02 . = χ  This is consistent with the value used by Woodford.  In the cashless 
limit, velocity becomes very large andχ goes to zero.  
The low calibrated value of χ  suggests that money demand (and money demand 
shocks) have little effect on the model’s implications.  This is the standard argument for 
ignoring money demand in the New Keynesian model.  This is true for positive issues. 
But as we will see this is not necessarily true for normative issues.    
In Woodford’s Table 6.1, page 431, he calibrates the standard model with 
. To match the impulse response to a monetary shock, Woodford needs a small 
value of 
0 ≠ cm U
κ (enough price stickiness). He thus chooses this parameter to equal 0.024. 
Given that the average mark-up in the US is around 15% he chooses θ= 7.88. 
Woodford’s benchmark calibration implies that  048 . = x λ  (8 8 . 7 / 16 * 024 . = x λ .  Note 
that the model is calibrated quarterly, but since the loss function has been transformed 














Woodford estimates that 1/3 of firms adjust their prices every quarter and calibrates ω = 
0.47 implying  038 . 0 ~ = κ . Given this, and the desire for an even smaller κ, he assumes 
that σ
-1 is quite small, or that   With  ω = 0.47, we have σ . 63 .
1 = +
− σ ω
-1 = 0.16, which is 
substantially smaller than is typically assumed in the real business cycle literature. The 
money demand semi-elasticity is set to 7 so that  . 7 / 1 / 1 = = i bi η  Assuming an annual 
velocity level of 7 (close to the M1 level), and  02 . = χ  we have  077 . = i λ .   
  17Table 6.2 (p. 433) compares optimal policy in the cashless limit model where 
0 = i λ , and the transactions-friction model in which  077 . = i λ .  Does the nature of 
optimal policy change?  The answer is unmistakable: yes! First, in the extreme case when 
0 = i λ  optimal monetary policy is not supported by a Taylor-type rule, while for 
077 . = i λ it clearly is. But even absent that difference, consider the Taylor-rules for a 
nearly-cashless environment ( 001 . = i λ ) and the version of the model calibrated to money 
demand ( 077 . = i λ ).  
t t t t t x i i i ˆ 90 . 3 ˆ 95 . 1 ˆ 01 . 1 ˆ 16 . 2 ˆ
2 1 ∆ + + − = − − π  when  077 . = i λ  
 when  t t t t t x i i i ˆ 3 . 300 ˆ 15 . 150 ˆ 01 . 1 ˆ 16 . 2 ˆ
2 1 ∆ + + − = − − π 001 . = i λ  
These rules are dramatically different since the values of the coefficients on the 
optimal Taylor rule (11) are directly affected by the size of  i λ . If we assume that the 
nearly-cashless economy well approximates the cashless-economy, we find in Table 6.2 
that optimal policy with money has significantly more fluctuations in the output gap 
(variances of 0 and 4.02, respectively) and significantly smaller variability in the nominal 
interest rate (13.83 and 4.96). The variance of inflation, however, is little affected. Some 
perspective on the extent of these differences is in order. Adding money to the model 
increased the variability of the output gap from zero to a value slightly greater than the 
historical variability of actual output (not the output gap) in US data. Hence, the nature of 
money demand is quite relevant for optimal monetary policy!  In short, for normative 
purposes, money demand seems quite important. 
  18Remember that λi is an indirect measure of the importance of money in the 
economy. Interestingly, Woodford’s benchmark calibration uses λi = .236, a value three 
times as high as the one arising from monetary frictions alone.   The calibration λi = .236 
arises from an approximation to the zero bound constraint in a cashless economy. The 
zero bound constraint is the requirement that the nominal rate of interest be non-negative.  
The fundamental loss function consists only of the inflation and output gap terms. 
However there is an additional constraint requiring that the mean interest rate exceed a 
multiple of the standard deviation of the interest rate. This ratio is chosen so that the 
likelihood of hitting the zero bound is sufficiently small. Hence, the coefficient λi is 
essentially the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated with this constrained optimization 
problem. With this value of λi, Woodford reports a variance of the output gap over five 
times larger than the historical (de-trended) variability of output! 
Woodford argues that if one starts from the value of λi = .236 and then adds 
transactions frictions to the model, there is little additional effect.  But this argument is 
relevant only if the original calibration λi = .236 is relevant.  In our view this is an 
exceedingly awkward way of examining the asymmetric effects arising from the zero 
bound, and most assuredly a dubious way of arguing for the unimportance of monetary 
frictions for normative issues. 
A final comment is on the size of κ. Recall that  κ σ ω κ ~ ) (
1 − + ≡ .  In the 
cashless economy, only the size of κ matters for the nature of optimal policy (λi=0 and 
θ
κ
λ = x ).  But in a model with transactions frictions (finite velocity), it matters why κ is 
small, whether is small or  ) (
1 − +σ ω κ ~ is small. Recall that κ ~ is a measure of how 
  19sticky prices are. For example, suppose that we calibrate κ ~ to a smaller value (very 
sticky prices) but set  larger.  The weight on the output gap, λ ) (
1 − +σ ω x, will be 
unchanged while the weight on interest rates, λi, will be smaller because the output gap 
will respond less to a given change in marginal cost than before. The resulting optimal 
Taylor rule will thus put relatively more weight on the output gap. Given that 
Woodford’s calibration of  was on the low end, the Taylor coefficient is likely 
to be underestimated.  
) (
1 − +σ ω
IV.  Money demand and timing. 
There are other issues that arise when we move away from the frictionless, but 
fictional, cashless limit.  In particular, we must address other questions concerning 
money.  For example, should we use cash-in-advance or cash-when-I’m-done timing for 
how real money balances in the utility function? What is the nature of shocks to money 
demand and secular movements in money demand?  Do firms and/or households use 
money?  To illustrate one of these issues, we follow Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) and 
examine the effect of money demand timing. 
  The previous model assumed CWID timing, that is, money balances at the end of 
the period, Mt+1, aid in facilitating transactions during time t.  A more natural choice for 
this variable is the cash the household has in advance of goods-market trading. That is, 
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  20Note that Nt is the cash the household has after leaving the financial market, but before 
entering the goods market for trading. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) call this cash-in-
advance (CIA) timing in that what generates transactions services is the cash the 
household has in advance of goods trading. In the case of CIA timing, the first order 
conditions are given by 
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Expressions (14) and (15) are similar to the expressions (2) and (3) for the case of 
CWID timing.  The fundamental difference between CIA and the earlier CWID timing is 
most apparent in the Fisher equation (13).  If the household decides to invest an 
additional $1 in the bond market, this comes at the cost of current consumption and 




t U t U ) ( ) ( +
.  This is in contrast to CWID timing, 
equation (1), in which a bond purchase has no effect on the household’s ability to carry 
out contemporaneous transactions.   
A standard argument for ignoring the role of money for positive analysis is to 
assume Ucm = 0.  But this assumption obviously does not work here since the marginal 
utility of money directly enters the Fisher equation. Woodford presents an example in 
appendix A.16 to illustrate that even with CIA timing the above dichotomy can survive, 
  21i.e. the Fisher equation (6) and the pricing equation (9) will not be affected by money 
balances. He presents a variation of a cash-credit good model by Lucas and Stokey 
(1987).  He also assumes an endowment economy and that the costs of using credit enter 
separably in utility. Under these assumptions the utility function with money is given by  
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where H is increasing and convex and total consumption is the sum of both cash and 





c = 1 ), Nt 
are the cash balances given by (12), and c2t is the consumption of the credit good.  These 
credit purchases involve a cost given by the function H.  In this case we have
     )
)
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so that  
    ( ) ( ) ( t V t U t U c m c = +
and the Fisher equation is independent of real balances.
 4  
  However, the dichotomy in Woodford’s example is lost if we move away from his 
assumption of an endowment economy. With production and endogenous labor supply, 
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4 This particular transactions cost function is also peculiar in that it generates a money demand curve that 
has non-constant elasticities.   
  22Money balances are still in the system via their effect on labor supply and thus 
production. Therefore, money demand is not just a residual equation and shocks to 
money demand once again play an important role in governing output and inflation.
5
V.  Money demand, timing, and equilibrium 
determinacy. 
We now discuss equilibrium determinacy. The importance of making sure that the 
solution to the model is unique is of paramount importance when choosing a monetary 
policy rule. Woodford clearly makes the case for this position when he states that  
 
“…if one evaluates policy rules according to how bad is the worst outcome that they 
might allow, it would be appropriate to assign an absolute priority to the selection of a 
rule that would guarantee determinacy of equilibrium.” [Page 89] 
 
  For simplicity we assume that monetary policy is given by a Taylor-type rule, 
which we assume to be  ( ) j t t t E R + = π τ ~ ~
. Taylor (1993) originally posited a current-looking 
rule (j = 0), but there is substantial empirical and anecdotal evidence that central banks 
are forward-looking and base current policy on forecasts of inflation (j = 1).  But the rule 
could be backward-looking (j = -1) as well.   Since the inclusion of the output gap in the 
Taylor rule would have a trivial effect on the determinacy conditions, we ignore it for 
simplicity. 
                                                 
5 Woodford also shows that the irrelevance of money disappears if the utility function is altered slightly so 
that the cash and credit goods are not perfect substitutes. 
  23The Taylor principle (τ > 1) is loosely considered both a necessary and sufficient 
condition for determinacy. In fact, this principle has become the holy grail when thinking 
about monetary policy. While this may be true for CWID timing, it is not always true for 
CIA timing.  To better understand the impact that CIA timing has on these determinacy 
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The Fisher equation under CIA timing is equivalent to the CWID-timing model 
except the interest rate is scrolled forward one period. With separable preferences 
between consumption and real cash balances (Ucm = 0) we have the following 
equivalences: CWID timing  with a forward-looking rule is equivalent to CIA timing 
with a current-looking rule; CWID timing with a current-looking rule is equivalent to 
CIA timing with a backward-looking rule; and CWID timing with a backward-looking 
rule is equivalent to CIA timing with a rule that looks two periods back. In general, these 
equivalences only hold for separable preferences (Ucm = 0).  But if we restrict utility to be 
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then these equivalences continue to hold.  It is straightforward to show that the conditions 
for determinacy for these preferences are given by restrictions on the size of τ, the central 
bank’s response to inflation.  In particular we have: 
Forward-looking rule (j = 1): 
  24 CWID  timing 
  Determinacy if and only if   κ
κ β
τ ~
~ ) 1 ( 2
1
+ +
< <  
 CIA  timing 
Always indeterminate if   1 ~ > +κ β . 
Current-looking rule (j = 0): 
CWID timing  
  Determinacy if and only if   τ < 1  
  CIA timing  
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Backward-looking rule (j = -1): 
CWID timing  
  Determinacy if and only if   κ
κ β
τ ~
~ ) 1 ( 2
1
+ +
< <  
  CIA timing  
  Determinacy if and only if   τ < 1  
 
The difference between the two timing assumptions is especially dramatic for forward-
looking Taylor rules. For reasonable parameter values (recall that Woodford calibrates 
038 . 0 ~ = κ ) CWID timing implies that τ > 1 is both necessary and sufficient for 
determinacy, but for CIA timing all forward looking rules are indeterminate since 
1 ~ > +κ β  for plausible parameter values.  This difference solely arises from our 
  25assumptions about money demand timing. This is another instance in which money 
demand is important for the analysis. 
It should be noted that interest rate rules with inertia have different determinacy 
conditions. Let  . Then, with CWID timing, the model is determinate if 
and only if 
t t t i i π τ ρ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 + = −
1 > +τ ρ , that is the long-run impact on interest rates from reacting to 
inflation must be greater than one. In particular, the optimal, super-inertial interest rate 
rules presented earlier are determinate, ie., they deliver a unique equilibrium.  
It is also interesting to note that these determinacy conditions do not depend on 
. The reason is because of our assumption that utility is linear in leisure. cm U
6
  Without 
this assumption, the sign of  will matter.  cm U
 
VI. NBER Volume. 
The NBER Volume Inflation Targeting is an eclectic collection of papers loosely 
organized around practical issues related to inflation targeting.  The volume includes both 
theoretical and empirical contributions and discuss issues such as: (1) Is the current 
practice of inflation targeting optimal?  Should inflation targeting be purely forward-
looking, or is there a role for history dependence?  (2) By how much is macroeconomic 
performance improved by a policy regime switch to inflation targeting?  And (3) How 
should inflation targeting be implemented (or should it be implemented) in middle-
income and transition economies?   
                                                 
6 This is also why σ does not enter in the above determinacy conditions. 
  26The volume includes nine papers as well as comments and discussion summaries.  
The introduction to the volume does a nice job of providing a road map for what lies 
ahead.  In this review we will focus on just two papers that address policy 
implementation issues. However, it should be noted that the influence of Woodford’s 
book is felt throughout the volume. 
Lars Svensson and Woodford use theory to analyze practical issues in 
“Implementing Optimal Policy through Inflation-Forecast Targeting.”  The basic idea can 
be articulated in the cashless model discussed above.  Recall that the condition 
characterizing optimal policy is given by (10) above 




λ = x .    As stressed by Woodford, optimal policy is history-dependent, ie., the 
optimal choice of current inflation and the output gap is affected by lagged values of the 
output gap.  Using the Calvo equation to eliminate the output gap we have 
  . (16)  0 ] ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ [ ˆ 1 1 1 1
2 = − + − + − + − + − − t t t t t t t t x t u u E E π π β π π λ π κ
Note the importance of history: the optimal value of the current inflation rate depends on 
lagged realized inflation and lagged expectations.  As stressed by Woodford and 
Svensson,
7 this history-dependence creates a fundamental difficulty with implementing 
policy.  In particular, there is a time inconsistency problem.   
  A simple example will illustrate this.  Recall the New Keynesian pricing 
equation: 
   t t t t t u E x + + = +1 ˆ ˆ ˆ π β κ π . 
                                                 
7 See also Chapter 7 of Woodford’s text. 
  27Consider a perfect foresight model in which there is a one-time unit positive shock to ut.  
Recall that the household dislikes any movements in inflation or the output gap.  But the 
pricing equation implies that something must give, ie., either πt must increase and/or xt 
must decrease. But these responses can be muted, and higher welfare achieved, if the 
central bank also decreases πt+1. A combined movement of πt, xt, and πt+1 is therefore 
optimal. But when tomorrow comes and ut+1 = 0, it is no longer optimal to set πt+1 at the 
value the central bank had previously announced. So how can the bank at time-t commit 
to setting πt+1 at a value that will no longer be optimal once time t+1 arrives?   
  How to solve this time consistency problem?  One possibility is to give discretion 
to the central bank, but impose a different welfare function.  For example, modify the 
loss function to impose penalties for deviations of inflation from the level forecasted the 
previous period—“inflation forecast targeting”. The difficulty here is that some 
deviations are desirable because new shocks have been observed. This could be remedied 
by allowing for deviations depending on the size of the new shock, but such an approach 
suffers from public communications problems.   
  A second set of possibilities explored by Svensson and Woodford is to set a rule 
for the central bank to follow. Which rule should be imposed? One approach is to have 
policy given by an interest rate rule in which this rule is a function only of the current and 
past exogenous shocks. Note that we can solve (16) backwards and express the optimal πt 
as a distributed lag of all current and past exogenous shocks. Similarly, we can express 
the optimal behavior of the nominal interest rate and the output gap as a unique function 
of all the current and past exogenous shocks.  Hence, the policy suggestion is to choose 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
  28the particular exogenous interest rate rule that it is exactly the one consistent with 
optimal behavior.  This is wildly naïve for at least two reasons.  First, it is quite heroic to 
assume that the central bank directly observes this sequence of exogenous shocks.  
Second, and emphasized by Svensson and Woodford, under such a policy the nominal 
interest rate is exogenous, and the equilibrium is no longer unique.  (In Section V, this 
corresponds to a Taylor rule with τ = 0 because the central bank is not responding 
directly to inflation but only to exogenous shocks.)   
  How about using a Taylor rule?  Substituting the optimal policy condition into the 
Fisher equation, we obtain a forward-looking Taylor rule that is consistent with optimal 
behavior: 
  1 ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ
+ − + = t t
x
n




As is well-known, this is not the way to implement this policy since it does not satisfy the 
Taylor Principle and thus is subject to indeterminacy. 
  Another possible implementation strategy is a mixture of these last two 
suggestions.  Let   denote the optimal behavior of these variables as functions 
solely of the exogenous shocks.  Let the central bank policy rule be given by 
* * * , , t t t x i π
) ( ) (
* * *
t t x t t t t x x i i − + − + = τ π π τπ ,    
where τπ and τx are the central bank’s responses to inflation and the output gap, 
respectively. To turn this discussion into a forecasting analogue, Svensson and Woodford 
assume that all endogenous variables are chosen one period in advance, so that we should 
think of the central bank committing at time-t to an interest rate given by  





1 1 + + + + + + − + − + = t t x t t t t x x i i τ π π τπ  
where  1 + t π and   now denote the time-t private sector forecast of future inflation and 
the output gap.  and  are the central bank’s forecast of future inflation and the 
output gap under the optimal equilibrium.   
1 + t x
*
1 + t π
*
1 + t x
It is key that the central bank’s forecast be a function solely of the exogenous 
shocks.  In equilibrium  and  . Therefore this policy will 
achieve equilibrium determinacy (for large enough values of τ
*
1 1 + + = t t π π
*
1 1 + + = t t x x
π and τx) and by 
construction support the optimum equilibrium as well.  
The informational assumptions required to support this rule are pretty heroic. Yet, 
even given these assumptions, it is difficult to see how the central bank could ever gain 
the credibility to support such a rule. Since in equilibrium  and 
, it will appear that the central bank is simply setting  , or 
equivalently setting the funds rate purely as a function of exogenous shocks, which as 
discussed above is indeterminate.  
*
1 1 + + = t t π π
*
1 1 + + = t t x x
*
1 1 + + = t t i i
  Cecchetti and Kim analyze a different type of time consistency problem in an 
environment similar to Svensson (1999).  They propose giving the central bank discretion 
and simultaneously imposing a different welfare function. Instead of modifying the loss 
function to impose penalties for deviations of forecasted inflation as considered by 
Svensson and Woodford, Cecchetti and Kim suggest that the central bank pursue a hybrid 
inflation/price level target. Instead of letting bygones be bygones, under a price level 
  30target inflation would be reversed in future periods so that the price level does not 
permanently deviate from its target path.  
  In contrast to the New Keynesian Phillips curve used in the bulk of both 
Woodford and Walsh, Cecchetti and Kim adopt the following Neo-Classical Phillips 
curve 
    t
e
t t t t p p y y ε α ρ + − + = − ) ˆ ˆ ( ˆ ˆ 1
where yt denotes the output gap and ρ denotes the persistence of output deviations.  A 
key issue in the analysis below is the source of this persistence—is this persistence 
efficient in that it also arises in the corresponding flexible price economy?  Cecchetti and 
Kim simply assume without deriving that the social welfare function is given by 
2 2 ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ t t
S y L λ π λ − + = . 
While this is similar to the loss function derived by Woodford, Woodford assumed the 
New Keynesian Phillip’s curve (9). Cecchetti and Kim, however, adopted the above Neo-
Classical Phillips curve. Since their social welfare function depends upon and not  t y
) ˆ ˆ ( 1 − − t t y y ρ , they implicitly assume that the persistence in output movements is not 
efficient.    
  This mismatch between the loss function and thePhillip’s curve creates a Barro-
Gordon type time inconsistency problem. In the wake of a negative shock, output is 
persistently too low so that tomorrow the central bank will want to inflate, ie., the central 
bank’s objective is now biased in that output is seen as too low. Rational expectations 
imply that this does not affect the behavior of output, but increases the level of inflation.  
  31To mitigate this problem Cecchetti and Kim propose that the central bank act in a 
discretionary manner but with the objective 
2 2
1 ˆ ) 1 ( ) ˆ ˆ ( t t t
CB y p p L λ η λ − + − = −  
so that with η = 1 we have inflation targeting and with η = 0 we have price-level 
targeting.  The question is what level of η will maximize the social objective. Should a 
discretionary central bank adopt something closer to a price-level target or an inflation 
target?  The advantage of a price level target is that in the wake of a negative shock the 
incentive to repeatedly inflate in future periods will be tempered. Thus the variability in 
inflation is reduced if η is smaller. In fact, the optimal η is decreasing in ρ (see their 
equation (14)).
8   
Cecchetti and Kim present evidence that for a large set of countries ρ is large 
enough to justify a relatively small η (a step towards price-level targeting). But again 
their evidence suggests that there is a large amount of persistence in output, not that this 
persistence is inefficient. If you assume that this persistence is inefficient, their 
calculations suggest that the welfare gains of using a hybrid rule (η between zero and 
one) compared to a rigid price rule (η = 0) are quite small. For transparency reasons, a 
strict price-level target may be preferred over a hybrid policy rule. 
Interestingly, in the environment of Svensson and Woodford, there also may be a 
reason to adopt a price-level target.  Recall that the optimal, time-consistent policy will 
typically have πt and πt+1 responding in opposite directions to shocks to the Phillips 
curve.  A central bank that acts with discretion but with a price-level target will respond 
                                                 
8 Note that if ρ is sufficiently small, the equilibrium is no longer of the form assumed by Cecchetti and 
Kim. 
  32in a qualitatively similar way.  Although the volume is titled “Inflation Targeting,” the 
potential desirability of price-level targeting seems like a fruitful avenue for future 
research. 
 
VII. Concluding Comments. 
A common theme in the Walsh and Woodford books is the usefulness of micro-
based general equilibrium models for the analysis of monetary policy. The rigors of 
general equilibrium analysis forces one to be specific, and the devil is often in the details.  
This emphasis on optimizing, forward-looking models is a healthy and constructive step 
in monetary policy-making.  To the extent that policymakers can be convinced of the 
usefulness of these models, a long stride will have been taken toward bridging the gap 
between academic researchers and monetary policymakers.  We have some concerns with 
some of the details in the work of Walsh and Woodford. In particular, we think the 
current de-emphasis on the role of money may have gone too far. It is important to think 
seriously about the role of money and how money affects optimal policy. But even with 
this misgiving, to the extent that the Walsh and Woodford volumes end up on the shelves 
and reading lists of central bank staff, the profession will have made a significant step 
forward.   
  In his discussion of Cecchetti and Kim, N. Gregory Mankiw provides a 
cautionary word of advice:  “We academics, however, should be careful to maintain a bit 
of humility when we engage in this policy debate. We have to admit that our 
understanding of inflation-output dynamics is still primitive. Until we reach a consensus 
                                                                                                                                                 
  
  33about the right model of the Phillips curve, we can’t be confident about the effect of 
alternative policy.”  This dose of humility, that our policy advice is only as good as our 
theory, is a useful reminder for theorists like ourselves who welcome the largely 
theoretical analysis of Walsh and Woodford.
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